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 Abstract 
The economic and political rise of China has led to considerable controversy regarding 
potential repercussions for the current global governance architecture. At least two oppos-
ing scenarios are conceivable: China’s adaptation to the rules and norms system shaped by 
developed countries or the pursuit of a distinctive policy approach, a possibility that in-
volves the danger of clashing regulatory policies.  
A recent and increasingly dynamic trend giving substance to the phenomenon of China’s 
rising importance is the growth of outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) by Chinese 
enterprises. Against this background, the present paper investigates the evolution and 
change of Chinese international investment policy-making, with a particular focus on bi-
lateral investment treaties (BITs) as the most important legal instrument for the govern-
ance of global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.  
China has been a committed signatory of BITs since the early 1980s (120 treaties up to 
2007). It is thus the second most active contracting party to BITs worldwide, surpassed 
only by Germany. The traditional Chinese BIT approach, however, has only cautiously 
supported the legal protection of FDI. As a mere capital-importer, China concluded BITs 
that contained serious reservations and safeguards intended to preserve policy spaces for 
the regulation of incoming investments. Starting at the end of the 1990s the Chinese gov-
ernment initiated a decisive policy shift towards a liberal BIT approach characterized by 
high levels of substantive and procedural investment protection.  
Upon examining a representative sample of Sino-foreign BITs, this study concludes that 
the policy shift was a pro-active decision of the Chinese government intended to introduce 
liberal treaty provisions first and foremost with developing countries which are the main 
destination of Chinese OFDI. A further explanation for this development may be found in 
the great importance attached to the promotion of OFDI through the “Going Global” strat-
egy announced by the Chinese government at the end of the 1990s. In sum, this paper 
concludes that China has adopted a complementary rather than a competitive approach in 
the field of global FDI governance. China has fully agreed to standards of the current in-
ternational liberal regime for FDI protection and has become an important global player in 
this context. This policy shift will yield consequences for China itself by levelling the 
playing field for international investors. Furthermore, developing countries that have con-
cluded BITs with China will face a further reduction of their legal and regulatory auton-
omy, which is already limited by treaties with developed countries. China’s BIT policy, 
therefore, contradicts the widespread rhetoric of a mutual beneficial South-South coopera-
tion. Lastly, the emerging complementarity of investment policies between China and de-
veloped countries at the bilateral level gives rise to the possibility of enhanced cooperation 
between both at higher levels, for instance as part of the Heiligendamm Process between 
G8 countries and emerging countries.  
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“Our nation’s position in the interna-
tional economic order will be to a 
large extent determined by the position 
of our nation’s large enterprises and 
groups”1 
1 Introduction 
Commentators on the rise of China (e.g. Humphrey / Messner 2006a and 2006b; Gu / 
Humphrey / Messner 2007; Phillips 2008) agree that its dynamic economic and political 
rise will have a significant impact on global governance processes and institutions still 
predominantly shaped by developed countries’ policies. There is a growing understanding 
that China, along with other large emerging countries like India, Brazil and South Africa, 
will reshape the current quasi-unilateral world order, thus giving rise to a new multipolar 
power constellation (Humphrey / Messner 2006a).  
However, it still remains unanswered how China will influence patterns and institutions of 
global governance and what kind of policies it will pursue towards developed and devel-
oping countries. In this context G. John Ikenberry asked in a recently published article 
whether “China [will] overthrow the existing order or become a part of it” (Ikenberry 
2008). In the context of global economic governance this question points to an open de-
bate on the issue of whether China will adapt to the system of rules and norms that forms 
part of the post-war Western economic order or whether it will pursue its own distinctive 
set of policies, a trend that might lead to a state of “turbulent multilateralism” with the 
inherent threat of clashing regulatory policies (Humphrey / Messner 2006a). Any answer 
to such a set of questions will influence the nature of evolving economic and political rela-
tions between China and developed countries and in particular between China and other 
developing countries, often understood as a mutual-beneficial South-South cooperation. 
A recent and increasingly dynamic trend giving substance to the phenomenon of China’s 
rising economic importance is the growth of outward foreign direct investments (OFDI)2 
by Chinese enterprises. Up to now, China was mainly recognized as a capital-importing 
economy. While still receiving large amounts of FDI, China, among other developing 
countries, has recently also been perceived as an important source for FDI (e.g. Sauvant 
2005; UNCTAD 2006; Aykut / Goldstein 2006; Broadman 2007; Pamlin / Baijin 2007; 
UNCTAD / UNDP 2007). Spectacular mergers and acquisitions (M&A) like the 2003 
takeover by TCL of the French television manufacturer Thomson, the Lenovo purchase of 
IBM’s personal computer branch in 2004, or the highly publicised, yet aborted, takeover 
                                                 
1 Wu Banguo, Chinese State Council, August 1998, quoted in Nolan / Zhang (2002, 2). 
2 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines FDI as follows: „Foreign 
direct investment reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy 
(‘direct investor’) in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor (‘direct investment 
enterprise’)” (OECD 1996, 7). It is possible to measure FDI according to flows and stocks, i.e. the aggre-
gate of previous flows. With regard to a certain economy it is possible to look at the direction of flows and 
stocks. OFDI, then, refers to flows or stocks of FDI carried out by home country business actors in other 
host economies. Inward FDI are flows and stocks of direct investments that are carried out by foreign 
business actors in the respective economy. 
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of the American oil company Unocal by the state-owned Chinese China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC) make clear that large Chinese enterprises have arrived at the 
world stage of global business. 
Against the background of growing Chinese OFDI flows, the main goal of this paper is to 
look at the evolution and change of Chinese international investment policy-making to-
wards developed and developing countries. A particular focus will be laid on bilateral in-
vestment treaties (BITs), the most important legal instrument for China in protecting both 
inward and outward FDI. Some recent studies by scholars of international investment law 
have observed and discussed a dramatic change in China’s BIT policy (Kong 2003; Cai 
2006 and 2007; Chen 2006 and 2007; Schill 2007). This paper will contribute to this on-
going academic discourse among experts of international law and the debate among schol-
ars of global economic governance outlined above. It argues that China has gradually in-
troduced a liberal international investment policy approach3 since the late 1990s. Most 
notably, this drastic policy shift was at first pro-actively launched towards developing 
countries. Developed countries only subsequently requested a renegotiation of their older 
BITs with China and adaptation of them to the higher standard of investment protection – 
a direct consequence of China's strategic shift in BIT policy towards developing countries.  
As substantiation for this argument, this paper resorts to a comprehensive content analysis 
of legal texts of Chinese BITs. The full text of these treaties was obtained from the “In-
vestment Instruments Online” database made available by the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).4 The database includes 66 of the 120 BITs signed 
by China until June 2007, of which only the 57 English texts were analysed (see Appendix 
B). The contents of these treaties were evaluated according to eight main provisions: ad-
mission of investment, absolute standards of treatment, relative standards of treatment, 
expropriation and compensation, repatriation of capital and profits, compensation for 
losses due to war and civil strife, settlement of investor-state disputes and prohibition of 
performance requirements. The contents of BITs follow a homogenous structure. Differ-
ences are found only in the particular wording of single provisions.  
In order to analyse the effectiveness of Chinese BITs the present paper resorts to a meth-
odology applied previously by Sen (2006). Accordingly, with regard to substantive and 
procedural investment protection, each provision’s effectiveness will be valued either as 
high, medium or low. This grading was made possible by a comparison of the wordings of 
legal BIT texts at different stages of the evolution of Chinese international investment 
policy-making. It shows that similar phrases were used for provisions in certain periods. A 
detailed explanation of each provision’s grading can be found in Appendix A. This ap-
proach allows for comparison of the vertical (i.e. chronological) progression of each pro-
vision and will eventually display a gradual policy shift that has taken place in Chinese 
BIT practice towards more effective investment protection (see Table 3). However, it does 
not allow for the measurement of the effectiveness of each BIT on the horizontal axis 
demonstrating the different impact of each provision with regard to the level of legal pro-
                                                 
3 The notion liberal refers to high levels of current substantive and procedural investment protection applied 
in mainstream developed country BITs. Normally, those liberal BITs include provisions on most-favoured 
nation treatment, national treatment of foreign investors and unrestricted investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms.  
4 See URL: http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch_779.aspx (accessed: 25 Jan. 2008). 
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tection available to foreign investors. This approach furthermore demands a certain sim-
plification of legal reality in international investment law making in order to be able to 
derive comparable findings. Therefore, this analysis covers only the legal texts of Chinese 
BITs and abstracts from single case law judgements.5 
Following an introduction to the global economic governance architecture of FDI in sec-
tion 2, with a discussion of the importance of BITs in the protection and promotion of for-
eign investments, this paper will examine China’s position as a rising source country for 
OFDI in section 3. The subsequent section 4 on the domestic regulatory framework for 
OFDI looks at Chinese government support of its large multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) 
investments in strategic sectors and regions through the “Going Global” strategy. The evo-
lution of the Chinese BIT policy from the early 1980s onwards will then be analysed in 
section 5, which includes the content analysis’ results and supports the argument of a stra-
tegic and pro-active shift in Chinese international investment policy making towards a 
liberal approach. Section 6 will sum up latest findings presented in this article. 
2 The global economic governance of foreign direct investment 
Extending the definition proposed by Schirm (2004, 3), global economic governance de-
scribes a rule-based management of the world economy which takes place on a bilateral, 
regional and multilateral level. With regard to the actors of global economic governance, 
nation states, international organisations as well as non-state actors like private companies 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play a prominent role.  
The global economic governance of FDI stands in the shadow of the world trade system. 
In contrast to the latter, no single and multilateral organization deals comprehensively 
with all aspects of FDI governance. Multilateral negotiations failed thrice: The Havana 
Charter proposed in 1948 never went into force, mainly due to the refusal of the US Con-
gress to ratify the agreement. Intended mainly to establish an International Trade Organi-
zation, the Charter also covered multilateral rules on investment. Most prominently, nego-
tiations of a proposed Multilateral Agreement of Investment (MAI) failed in the late 1990s 
within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Investment 
negotiations in the Doha Development Round in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
suffered defeat in 2003, too, due to fierce resistance from developing countries and critical 
NGOs.6 In the absence of a multilateral investment agreement, global FDI flows are pro-
tected by a complex, multilayered and multifaceted patchwork of roughly 5,500 interna-
tional investment agreements (IIAs) on a bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral 
level (UNCTAD 2007a, 16–17). 
 
                                                 
5 The repercussions of this simplification are expected to be rather small due to the very limited use of in-
ternational arbitration by Chinese investors. 
6 Zattler (1999) gives an overview of the failed negotiations of a Multilateral Agreement for Investment 
(MAI) within the OECD and analyses the potential economic effects of such an agreement. With regard to 
the negotiations of the so called Singapore Issues within the WTO negotiations, Ferrarini (2003) summa-
rizes the arguments for and against multilateral rules for FDI. 
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In their sum, these agreements constitute the global economic governance architecture for 
FDI (Table 1). On the multilateral level, investment-related rules are mainly incorporated 
into single WTO agreements such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). WTO agree-
ments, however, only partially govern FDI flows. The GATS deals most directly with in-
vestment issues which are addressed in the regulations on commercial presence of foreign 
investors and the ruling on the temporary entry of managerial personnel (Houde / Yan-
naca-Small 2004, 6). Furthermore, the TRIMs agreement bans certain trade restricting 
investment measures, and the TRIPS agreement introduces minimum standards for the 
international protection of intellectual property rights. Among member countries of the 
OECD the whole spectrum of international investment relations is governed in the Code of 
Liberalization of Capital Movements (CCM) and the Declaration on International Invest-
ment and Multinational Enterprises (DIIME). The most prominent and most comprehen-
sive regional agreement governing investment flows is the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). It provides high levels of substantive and procedural investment 
protection as well as liberalization commitments that go beyond the majority of BITs 
which are regarded by scholars of international economic law as the main legal instrument 
for FDI protection within the global economic governance architecture for FDI (Dolzer / 
Stevens 1995; UNCTAD 1998, 2007b). 
Apart from standards for foreign investments embedded in the governance structure of 
MNE-led global value chains, international rules for FDI are mainly put forward by state 
actors, as the above listing of international agreements indicates. However, “once in force, 
the role played by non-state actors in the regime’s enforcement mechanisms can be of 
greater significance than the role played by states” (Schneidermann 2004, 68). IIAs nota-
bly grant foreign investors direct legal personality under international law (Peterson 2005, 
8). Without being obliged to submit a claim to domestic courts, foreign investors may sue 
host countries directly before an international tribunal and thus limit their national legal 
sovereignty. Against the background of international investment agreement (IIA) texts 
drafted in an open and often vaguely manner, private actors play a significant, though in-
direct, role in setting rules for foreign investments through the interpretation in interna-
tional arbitration. 
BITs are defined by Vandevelde (2000, 469–70) as agreements that “protect investments 
by investors of one state in the territory of another state by articulating substantive rules 
governing the host state’s treatment of the investment and by establishing dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms applicable to alleged violations of those rules”. By concluding BITs, 
contracting parties aim at fostering economic cooperation amongst each other by stimulat-
ing favourable conditions for investments made by enterprises of one party in the territory 
of the other. The underlying logic of these agreements therefore proclaims that an intro-
duction of minimum standards of protection will result in increasing investment flows and 
hence spur economic development processes in host as well as home countries. 
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A short review of the economic literature on the actual effectiveness of BITs, however, 
leads to an inconclusive picture. On the one side, authors like Hallward-Driemeier (2003) 
find little support for the argument that BITs increase FDI inflows. Instead, she argues, 
they can bite, reducing available policy spaces and exposing policy makers to liabilities 
caused by legal claims by foreign investors. Tobin / Rose-Ackermann (2005) argue that 
BITs encourage FDI only to a limited extent. Banga (2003) and Neumayer / Spess (2005) 
on the other hand find empirical evidence that a higher number of BITs raises FDI in-
flows. Apart from results of economic models it is safe to maintain that BITs entail eco-
nomic and political gains as well as costs. They may promote FDI inflows and thus help to 
speed up development processes in the home as well as in the host economy. Another im-
portant rationale behind the conclusion of international economic agreements like BITs is 
the improvement of political relations. The increased diffusion of BITs can also lead to 
economic costs for host developing countries. Strong protection clauses and comprehen-
sive investor-state dispute resolution provisions in modern BITs may result in a loss of 
national autonomy and reduced policy spaces to pursue independent national development 
strategies. The rapid diffusion of BITs also increases the complexity of policymaking in 
developing countries. Negotiating and administering BITs requires capacities that they 
may find hard to provide.  
As legal instruments, BITs started to spread in the late 1950s with a first treaty being 
signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959. During the 1960s and 1970s BITs were 
customarily signed between highly developed European countries and poorer developing 
countries in order to counter an increasingly hostile international investment environment 
(Vandevelde 1998, 386). The growth rate of BITs remained moderate until the mid-1980s, 
with roughly 20 treaties being signed each year. This changed at the end of the 1980s and 
during the 1990s, with more than 100 treaties being signed annually. This sharp increase 
had two main reasons: firstly, the decision of the United States at the beginning of the 
1980s to adopt BITs as foreign investment protection devices resulted in a reversal of de-
veloping countries’ previous hostility towards FDI (protection) in the 1980s (Vandevelde 
1998); and secondly, the growing competition among developing countries to capture a 
share of global FDI flows (Elkins / Guzmán / Simmons 2006). BITs today are part of the 
policy package introduced by most developing countries to promote inward FDI.7  
International law literature reflects the fact that BIT contents today show a considerable 
uniformity with regard to general provisions such as the absolute and relative standards of 
treatment, protection against expropriation, transfer of funds, compensation for losses 
caused by war and civil strife as well as dispute settlement procedures. This consistency 
has its roots in the fact that BITs are normally negotiated on the basis of two main model 
treaties: First, a European admission model that has found use by developed countries and 
developing countries, such as China, alike. The European model provides protection for 
investments only after admission of the foreign investment according to the host coun-
tries’ domestic laws and regulations.8 Second, a North American pre-establishment model 
is in use, applied mainly by the US from the 1980s onwards, by Canada from the mid 
                                                 
7 Apart from BITs, developing countries substantially removed national regulations against FDI during the 
last two decades (UNCTAD 2007a, 14–16). 
8 The South-South BIT approach which is close to the European approach typically puts more emphasis on 
exceptions and so called folk-in-the-road-clauses (UNCTAD 2004, 224). 
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1990s onwards, and by Japan from the beginning of this century. This category of BIT 
goes well beyond the admission model’s post-establishment protection of investments. It 
entails pre-establishment protection clauses that restrict screening powers of host states 
and therewith has been observed to lead to a liberalization of host countries’ regulatory 
systems. In contrast to the European model, which accepts the right of host governments 
to regulate the entry of FDI, the North American model restricts the sovereignty of the 
host country in regulating FDI prior to the establishment of a FDI project (Gugler / Tom-
sik 2007; UNCTAD 2007b, 141). Apart from the fact that BITs normally address the same 
range of issues, they are increasingly becoming “more sophisticated in content, clarifying 
in greater detail the meaning of certain standard clauses and procedural rules relating to 
dispute settlement” (UNCTAD 2006, 26). The general protection level for foreign invest-
ments has grown over time. This leads critics of international investment rule-making to 
argue that capital-importing (developing) countries are structurally disadvantaged by these 
treaties which “undermine the ability of host governments to effectively regulate foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to support economic development” (Oxfam 2007, 22). 
From a theoretical viewpoint, the main economic rationale behind BITs is to provide host 
countries with a commitment device in order to signal to international investors that their 
funds will not be expropriated once an investment has been carried out. In other words, 
BITs are used by capital-importing countries to reassure foreign investors that national 
rules on the liberalization and protection of FDI are credible. The expectations by MNEs 
concerning the nature of the FDI regulatory regime are central to the theory of foreign 
investment protection. According to game theory models, foreign investing enterprises 
face holdup risks that potentially reduce FDI inflows since foreign investments normally 
involve sunken capital that cannot be removed in the short run without considerable losses 
for MNEs (Markusen 2001, 289). Once an investment has been undertaken, the host coun-
try government may reverse laws and regulations that were in place at the moment the 
investment was negotiated in order to expropriate ex post rents from the MNE. Foreseeing 
such a reversal of the initial regulatory framework for investments, risk-averse MNEs shy 
at undertaking investments which leave both parties worse off. Host countries may there-
fore install a commitment mechanism and bind themselves not to expropriate ex post in 
order to attract more FDI (Markusen 2001, 289), thus locking in national reforms through 
BITs, reassuring foreign investors, and promoting FDI inflows.  
BITs are concluded mainly between capital-exporting and capital-importing countries with 
differing expectations with regard to their purpose and benefits.9 Capital-exporting coun-
tries negotiate BITs pro-actively in order to protect their national enterprises’ foreign in-
vestments. For capital-importing countries, BITs serve as a means to attract FDI inasmuch 
as they commit themselves to respect the property and contractual rights of foreign inves-
tors. The actual protection level provided by these treaties is strongly linked to the out-
come of the negotiation process between the contracting parties and, hence, the distribu-
tion of relative (economic) power between host and home countries. Traditionally, foreign 
investment flows originated predominantly in developed countries on a North-North and a 
North-South basis, with developing countries being in the weaker bargaining position as 
                                                 
9 There are almost no BITs between capital-exporting (developed) countries. Instead, North-North invest-
ment relations are governed by other international instruments (UNCTAD 2005a, 24). 
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host economies to FDI. Consequently, the latter tried to balance the impact of BITs in or-
der to regulate incoming FDI and preserve national policy spaces.  
These established patterns in international investment lawmaking have recently been chal-
lenged by shifting patterns of global investment flows. As will be shown in the subsequent 
section for the case of China, large developing countries are evolving as foreign investors 
in their own right. Their OFDI flows are mostly directed towards other developing coun-
tries on a South-South direction. This salient trend underlines anew the observation that 
rising developing countries are finding themselves in a new and complex situation which 
will challenge their traditionally cautious international investment policy approach. As 
capital-importers they will still have an interest in preserving safeguards in their BITs in 
order to support domestic development processes. As newly evolving capital-exporters, on 
the other hand, these countries will have to (re-)negotiate liberal BITs with other develop-
ing countries in order to protect the foreign investments of their own national enterprises. 
Developing countries with growing OFDI flows, therefore, will have to find a balanced 
international investment policy approach that will tend to be more liberal the stronger 
OFDI grows in relation to inward foreign direct investment (IFDI). 
3 Growing overseas foreign direct investments from China 
FDI originating in developing countries is not a new phenomenon. In fact, developing 
country enterprises already started investing abroad in the 1970s. Only in the early 1990s, 
however, did OFDI from developing countries increase substantially. OFDI flows 
amounted to US$ 3 billion in 1980, grew modestly to US$ 13 billion until 1990, rose to 
US$ 147 billion in 2000 and peaked at US$ 174 billion in 2006. Aggregated OFDI stocks 
from developing countries grew from US$ 145 billion by 1990, to US$ 858 billion in 2000 
and added up to US$ 1600 billion in 2006, constituting nearly 13 per cent of total world 
stocks compared to 8 per cent in 1990 (UNCTAD 2006, 105–108; UNCTAD 2007a, 299–
306). 
Research on Chinese OFDI is still at its starting point. Since Chinese OFDI is a relatively 
new empirical phenomenon, several statistical problems call for caution with regard to 
their interpretation (Schüller / Turner 2005, 3). There are reasons to expect both underes-
timation as well as overestimation of actual Chinese OFDI. Chinese official data from the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) traditionally reflects investments with official ap-
proval, which is required for initial investments only. However, actual OFDI flows are 
often carried out through private channels as well and thus remain uncounted in the offi-
cial data available (Frost 2004, 5). Moreover, Aykut and Ratha (2004, 160–162) have 
pointed out that official statistics do not always include financing and reinvesting invest-
ments. Additionally, they tend to reflect mainly large investments to the neglect of smaller 
ones (Aykut / Goldstein 2006, 10). The empirical study by Wong and Chan (2003, 277) 
supports this view, estimating that unauthorised capital outflows between 1997 and 1999 
accounted for US$ 53 billion. Round-tripping of Chinese OFDI, on the other hand, may 
lead to an overestimation of actual investment flows bearing in mind that it “refers to the 
domestic capital that has fled the home country and then flows back in the form of foreign 
direct investment” (Xiao 2004, 15). Thus, it leads to an inflation of OFDI statistics. Xiao 
(2004, 12) identifies two broad types of round-tripping FDI: First, it is used as a means of 
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escaping regulation and taking advantage of preferential treatment for foreign invest-
ments.10 Second, it is used for value-added purposes in order to get better financial ser-
vices by a listing in advanced stock markets. In the case of China, Hong Kong clearly 
plays an important role due to its close economic ties to mainland China, as expressed in 
the volume of bilateral investment flows. According to the already cited study by Xiao, 
Chinas round-tripping FDI is likely to amount to 40 per cent or be within the range of 30 
to 50 per cent of reported flows. Another factor leading to an overassessment of Chinese 
statistics are OFDI to offshore financial centres like the Cayman Islands and British Virgin 
Islands which account for more than 52 per cent of outflows in 2005. 
In order to give an overview of aggregated flows and stocks of Chinese OFDI and the 
Chinese OFDI/IFDI ratio on a regional basis, the analysis of Chinese OFDI in this section 
mainly employs data from UNCTAD. UNCTAD uses MOFCOM data, which was re-
ported on an approval basis up to 2003 and reflects actual flows on a balance of payment 
basis from 2003 onwards. Due to the fact that UNCATD statistics do not provide data 
which is comprehensive enough for an illustration of the geographical distribution of Chi-
nese OFDI,11 MOFCOM data from the annually published China Commerce Yearbook 
was used instead. Both sources include non-trading FDI only and exclude data covering 
the financial sector. 
Taking into account the inaccuracy and limited availability of data, it is nevertheless clear 
that China has become an important source country for OFDI. UNCTAD (2007a, 299–
306) data suggests that China is currently the 7th largest foreign investor among develop-
ing countries in terms of stocks. Figure 1 indicates that accumulated OFDI stocks were 
marginal during the first half of the 1980s, but have since grown strongly and reached 
US$ 73 billion in 2006. The illustration of OFDI flows in Figure 2 supports this view. In 
order to avoid the usual strong volatility of OFDI flows on an annual basis, Figure 2 also 
entails a graph that shows OFDI flows on a three year average. OFDI flows grew particu-
larly strongly in the first half of the 1990s, slowed down until 2000, and increased thereaf-
ter again. Especially noteworthy is the sharp increase of OFDI flows in 2005 (US$ 12 bil-
lion) and 2006 (US$ 16 billion). This listing of aggregated figures and the driving forces 
on the political and business level mentioned below give reason to presume that Chinese 
OFDI will grow more strongly in the years to come. 
 
                                                 
10 The proposed unified tax reform that was discussed in December 2006 would result in a harmonization 
of tax levels for domestic and foreign firms and might lead to a decline of the first type of round-
tripping. 
11 UNCTAD data provides no figures on flows for the years 1996–1998 and stocks between 1996–2001. 
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Figure 2: Chinese OFDI flows 1982–2006 (US$ at current prices in millions) 
 
Source: Own presentation based on UNCTAD statistics, available at www.unctad.org/fdistatistics 
Figure 1: Chinese OFDI stock 1982–2006 (US$ at current prices in millions) 
 
Source: Own presentation based on UNCATD statistics, available at www.unctad.org/fdistatistics 
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The geographical distribution of Chinese OFDI flows has undergone a major shift since 
the beginning of the 1990s. Table 2 reveals that Chinese OFDI shifted from developed 
countries to developing countries in Asia and Latin America. With regard to developed 
countries alone, Chinese OFDI flows shifted from North America, which attracted nearly 
50 per cent of all Chinese OFDI in the 1980s, to Europe which is currently the third most 
important host region and accounts for 15,2 per cent. With respect to developing coun-
tries, Asia and Latin America are attracting more than 70 per cent of all Chinese outflows. 
Equally noteworthy is the strong boost of Chinese OFDI in the 1990s towards the African 
continent, which was home to 24 per cent of all Chinese investments during 1997 and 
2001. Between 2003 and 2005 Africa attracted US$ 882 million, ranking fourth even be-
fore North America. With regard to single countries, Table 3 shows that Hong Kong is the 
most important destination of Chinese OFDI. The Cayman Islands and the British Virgin 
Islands are ranked second and third, suggesting that large amounts of Chinese OFDI are 
going to offshore financial centres and flowing back to mainland China as round-tripping 
FDI or taking another direction towards third countries. The actual amount of such redi-
rected OFDI, however, is hard to deduce from official statistics.12 With regard to their 
sectoral distribution, Chinese OFDI are mainly conducted in the manufacturing, resource-
seeking and the IT and software sectors.13 
Apart from the strong growth of foreign investments by Chinese enterprises in absolute 
terms, OFDI is still subordinate in relation to IFDI into the Chinese economy. The grow-
ing importance of OFDI will therefore be exemplified here by a relative indicator, i.e. the 
OFDI/IFDI ratio. This ratio refers to what Dunning (1981, 30) has called a “country’s net 
international direct investment position” which describes “the sum of the direct invest-
ment by its own enterprises outside its national boundaries minus the direct investment of 
foreign owned enterprises within its boundaries.” The net international direct investment 
position is part of the Investment Development Path approach which describes the stages 
of development of an economy from a mere importer of FDI, to an exporter and eventu-
ally to a net exporter (Dunning 1981; on the approach see also Dunning 1986; Dunning / 
Narula 1996). Dunning’s concept of the net international direct investment position will be 
modified, taking into account the fact that China is still enjoying rising inflows of FDI. 
Since inflows are growing stronger than outflows in absolute terms, China’s net interna-
tional direct investment position is growing negatively. This seems to indicate that China’s 
role as a home country of global FDI is declining. Changing investment patterns are there-
fore better illustrated by using a relative measurement that is more appropriate to under-
line the growing importance of OFDI. For this reason the OFDI/IFDI ratio, i.e. the per-
centage of OFDI to IFDI, is employed in this analysis. 
 
                                                 
12 UNCTAD data show that Hong Kong, the Virgin Islands and the British Virgin Islands are ranked first, 
second and eighth as sources of inflows of FDI in 2005.  
13 MOFCOM data for the year 2005 shows the following sectoral distribution of Chinese OFDI: manufac-
turing (30 %), resource-seeking (29.8 %), IT and software (27.3 %), business services (5.4 %), retail 
(3.4 %), communication (2.2 %) and others (5.4 %), cited in Lunding (2006, 2). 
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The available data shows that outflows from China grew more rapidly than inflows during 
the last few years, demonstrating that China’s overall importance as a capital-exporting 
economy is evolving. This argument is supported by China’s total OFDI/IFDI ratio which 
has been growing strongly – although from a low basis – since 2002 (Table 4).14 In 2005 
China’s overall outflows accounted for 17 per cent of inflows only. Such limited OFDI in 
relation to IFDI in itself would not indicate a strong incentive for the Chinese government 
to change its cautious international investment policy approach in favour of a liberal ap-
proach to help protect outgoing FDI. The geographical breakdown of the Chinese 
OFDI/IFDI ratio helps to differentiate the picture in order to develop an understanding of 
liberal Chinese international investment policy-making. Accordingly, Table 4 shows that 
the OFDI/IFDI ratio towards developing countries is almost double the overall ratio and 
roughly six times higher than the ratio towards developed countries. This presentation of 
the relative distribution of reciprocal FDI flows suggests that China’s interest in strong 
legal investment protection through BITs would be especially pronounced towards devel-
oping countries. The subsequent section 4 substantiates this assumption by analysing the 
Chinese strategic approach of OFDI promotion.  
Several reasons suggest that Chinese OFDI will grow strongly in the future and will have 
an increasing influence on Chinese international investment policy making. The underly-
ing rationale of expanding Chinese OFDI can be generally distinguished into two sets of 
strategic interests of the Chinese government. Although it has been argued that commer-
cial interests have now become the main driving force behind Chinese OFDI (e.g. Cai 
1999, 867), they cannot be considered without taking into account the continuing persis-
tent interest and influence of the Chinese government.15 With regard to business interests, 
growing OFDI by Chinese enterprises is a response to push factors on the domestic level 
and pull factors on the global economy level. Chinese enterprises face a growing competi-
tive pressure on the domestic market especially after the WTO accession in 2001 and the 
need to relocate mature industries to lower wage economies (UNCTAD 2004, 25, 27). 
Pull factors are of growing importance, with Chinese MNEs taking advantage of the op-
portunities of the emerging global business environment. In contrast to the traditional per-
spective that attributes the internationalization of Western multinationals to a previous 
accumulation of competitive advantages (asset exploiting), recent business literature sug-
gests that MNEs from emerging economies tend to internationalize in order to build up 
competitive advantages (asset augmentation) (e.g. Mathews 2002, 2006). As recent large 
M&As emphasize, this applies especially to Chinese enterprises.16 They invest abroad in 
order to acquire scarce advanced technologies, brand names, distribution networks and 
managerial know-how (Lunding 2006, 4), and as Wang (2002, 202) argues, Chinese en-
terprises use OFDI frequently as a means to gain access to developed country markets that 
are often protected by trade barriers of regional blocs. 
 
                                                 
14 The increase of the OFDI/IFDI ratio from 2002 to 2003 may be due to a change in the methodology of 
OFDI data of UNCTAD from an “approval” (until 2002) to an “actual” basis (from 2003 onwards). 
15 Wang (2002, 203–205) refers to this interconnectedness with the notion of OFDI „motivations with 
Chinese characteristics“. 
16 See Lunding (2006, 2) for a list of major mergers and acquisitions by Chinese enterprises.  
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In addition to these factors, Chinese multinationals rely on strong political support and 
incentives to invest abroad in strategic regions and sectors, especially in developing coun-
tries. Since the gradual liberalization process that began in the late 1970s the Chinese gov-
ernment has pursued an industrial policy that strongly supports its MNEs. Especially note-
worthy in this context is the “Going Global” strategy aimed at the promotion of OFDI as a 
strategic policy tool. This will be described in more detail in the subsequent section. The 
most frequently cited reason of the Chinese government for supporting OFDI by Chinese 
(state-owned) enterprises is the growing dependency of the Chinese economy on a stable 
and increasing supply of energy and raw materials (e. g. Lunding 2006, 3–4). Another 
important driving force behind Chinese OFDI is found in the pressure created by escalat-
ing foreign currency reserves that amounted to US$ 1,531 billion in 2007 and are expected 
to grow to US$ 1,911 billion in 2008 and US$ 2,411 billion in 2008 (IMF 2008). These 
reserves are still predominantly held in US dollars and hence face high devaluation risks 
with increasing pressure to adjust the Chinese Renminbi against the US dollar. According 
to UNCTAD (2006, 55) the increasing amount of “China dollars” will make the promo-
tion of Chinese OFDI imperative for a Chinese government in search of alternative uses 
for them. UNCTAD thus predicts a strong rise of Chinese OFDI, recalling that the rapid 
accumulation of foreign currencies in Japan in the 1980s led to a strong increase in Japa-
nese OFDI. In this context China established a sovereign wealth fund (China Investment 
Company) in 2007 with US$ 200 billion of available investment capital (Jiang 2007). 
 
 
 
Table 4: China’s OFDIa/IFDIb ratio by region 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total 0,084 0,018 0,003 0,002 0,003 - - - 0,015 0,014 0,015 0,019 0,053 0,091 0,169
Developed  
Countries 0,281 0,045 0,007 0,002 0,003 - - - 0,007 0,005 0,005 0,016 0,015 0,023 0,048
    Europe 0,009 0,033 0,005 0,002 0,001 - - - 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,028 0,017 0,036
    North America 0,940 0,030 0,008 0,003 0,006 - - - 0,018 0,011 0,012 0,025 0,012 0,027 0,075
    Other  0,010 0,060 0,006 0,001 0,001 - - - 0,001 0,003 0,003 0,016 0,008 0,025 0,042
Developing  
Countries 0,006 0,009 0,003 0,002 0,003 - - - 0,013 0,009 0,014 0,017 0,073 0,121 0,273
    Africa 0,000 2,447 0,378 1,944 0,862 - - - 0,216 0,299 - - - - - 
    Latin America* 1,035 0,543 0,169 0,005 0,014 - - - 0,054 0,009 0,006 0,002 0,156 0,201 0,589
    Asia and Oceania 0,004 0,006 0,002 0,001 0,002 - - - 0,006 0,006 0,015 0,020 0,052 0,091 0,144
    South-East Europe 21,802 2,532 0,168 0,080 0,004 - - - 1,062 1,311 - - - - -  
Source: Own presentation based on UNCATD statistics, available at www.unctad.org/fdistatistics. 
a OFDI flows data are on an “approval” basis until 2002 and an “actual” data from 2003 onwards. OFDI  
 data between 1996 and 1998 is not available.  
b IFDI data are on an “actual” basis. IFDI data for Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean is not  
 available from 2001 onwards. 
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4 The domestic regulatory framework for overseas foreign direct 
investment 
Starting in 1978, the transformation of the Chinese economy from a centrally planned to a 
market-oriented one has led to a continuing deregulation of the Chinese OFDI regime and 
an increase of OFDI promotion activities. The gradual liberalization process of the regula-
tory regime for Chinese OFDI can be described using the four stage model presented by 
Wong and Chan (2003, 279–81): During the first stage (1979–85), Chinese authorities 
followed a restrictive policy towards overseas investments. State-owned as well as provin-
cial and municipal enterprises under the guidance of the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade MOFERT, the predecessor of MOFCOM) and the Commission for 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade were the only actors allowed to undertake OFDI 
projects. Consequently, OFDI projects were small in number and size. The second phase 
(1986–91) brought first, cautious, liberalization steps that led to increasing OFDI flows. A 
directive by MOFERT expanded the scope of enterprises eligible for OFDI: both state-
owned and private enterprises were allowed to apply for permission to establish subsidiar-
ies under the condition that they provided sufficient capital, technical and operational 
know-how as well as a suitable foreign partner. The third stage (1992–97) saw further 
increasing OFDI flows. The Chinese government adapted its OFDI policy approach and 
initiated promotion activities such as seminars and workshops for Chinese enterprises on 
how to invest abroad. Due to an erosion of state-owned assets in the course of OFDI ex-
pansion, the Chinese government, however, introduced various regulations for stricter and 
more rigorous screening and monitoring processes. The fourth stage (since 1998) was 
characterized by the announcement and the subsequent implementation of the “Going 
Global” strategy. As Cai (2006, 626) states, the “Going Global” strategy marked the tran-
sition of the Chinese OFDI policy from regulation to encouragement of foreign invest-
ments. It was first announced in 1998 and was later embedded in the Tenth Five-Year Plan 
for National Economy and Social Development in 2001. It mainly refers to the foreign 
investment activities by Chinese enterprises and resulted in the emergence of an inde-
pendent OFDI policy in China (Cai 2006, 627).17 
The announcement of the "Going Global" strategy is widely acknowledged to have been a 
vital part of the opening process of the Chinese economy that reached a new stage with the 
accession of China to the WTO in 2001. The accelerated exposure of Chinese enterprises 
to the world market prompted the Chinese government to reconsider its traditionally 
strong influence and direct control over the business sector (Schüller / Turner 2005, 9). 
This strategy may also be considered as part of a Chinese industrial policy approach ac-
companying the Chinese “peaceful rise” foreign policy, a continuation of the international 
“peace and development” strategy formulated by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s. The 
stated purpose of this policy is to restore the century-long position of China as an influen-
tial international actor that peaked, according to Maddison (2004), in 1800 with China 
contributing 33 per cent to the global GDP (Garver 2005). In sharp contrast to Mao 
Zedong’s confrontational foreign policy approach, Chinese leadership since Deng has em-
phasized the importance of China’s integration into the world economy in order to support 
the domestic development process. The build-up of a number of global champions able to 
                                                 
17 The “Going Global” strategy refers also to overseas construction contracting and international service 
provision (UNCTAD 2006, 210). 
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compete on the global market has since been an explicit industrial policy goal reconfirmed 
by a "Going Global" strategy that states:  
“In our world today economic competition between nations is in fact between each 
nation’s large enterprises and enterprise groups. A nation’s economic might is con-
centrated and manifested in the economic power and international competitiveness of 
its large enterprises and groups.”18 
Apart from strengthening its national competitiveness through a number of Chinese enter-
prises, the current government gives priority to resource exploration projects that promote 
the export of domestic technologies, overseas research and development, and M&As 
which enhance the international competitiveness of Chinese enterprises and accelerate 
their foreign market presence (UNCTAD 2006, 210). 
In this context the Chinese government’s approval process for OFDI has been streamlined 
and decentralized in order to promote foreign investments by Chinese enterprises. The State 
Council has assigned most of its regulatory authority to MOFCOM and the local govern-
ment level. It retains its authority as a final arbiter, but only with regard to investments that 
would have significant macroeconomic or foreign policy implications (Iyengar 2004). Ac-
cording to the 2004 "Decision of the State Council on Reforming the Investment System" 
the authority of approval rests with the central government for resource extraction projects 
whose investment volume exceeds US$ 30 million and for non-resource projects with an 
investment volume of more than US$ 10 million (UNCTAD 2007a, 54). For projects in-
volving a lesser volume, the approval processes of provincial governments are to be applied; 
these are less comprehensive and complicated than the process applied by MOFCOM at the 
state level (Pamlin / Baijin 2007, 19). The role and influence of the Chinese government 
remain strong in guiding OFDI according to certain target regions and sectors (UNCTAD 
2007a, 55), using the approval process to influence Chinese OFDI (Wang 2002, 194–6), and 
due to the corporate governance structure of state-owned enterprises. 
The Chinese government has also introduced several incentives to promote Chinese OFDI 
in specific areas (UNCTAD 2007a, 54–6). Chinese enterprises are, for example, exempted 
from corporate income tax for five years after the beginning of an overseas operation. This 
income tax exemption continues to apply to Chinese enterprises operating in countries that 
have concluded double taxation treaties with China. In addition to central government tax 
incentives, some local governments also grant preferential treatment for foreign investing 
enterprises. Chinese enterprises are also entitled to apply for loans from commercial 
banks. Export credits are given to all Chinese enterprises exporting production equipment, 
technology know-how, parts and components, as well as raw and processed materials to 
their foreign affiliates. In October 2004 the National Development and Reform Commis-
sion (NDRC) and the Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC) jointly decided to provide 
credit support to special overseas investment projects. A Specific Credit Fund has been set 
up to support key overseas investment projects. In September 2005 NDRC and the Chi-
nese Development Bank declared their provision of financial support for certain key in-
vestment projects encouraged by the Chinese government. The State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) decided in August 2005 to simplify administrative formalities 
                                                 
18 Wu Banguo, Chinese State Council, August 1998, quoted in Nolan / Zhang (2002, 2). 
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for financial guarantees given by Chinese banks for overseas investing enterprises (Cai 
2006, 629–30). In this context Iyengrar (2004) found that state-owned enterprises gener-
ally enjoy preferential treatment in the OFDI regulatory regime owing to the generous 
support of state-owned banks. China is still a country that exercises foreign exchange con-
trol but has relaxed existing restrictions in last years. A decision by SAFE in 2005 ex-
tended a pilot program allowing foreign investing enterprises to purchase foreign ex-
change up to US$ 3 billion without permission in the entire country and increased the 
threshold to US$ 5 billion (Cai 2006, 630). Furthermore, under certain conditions the Chi-
nese government gives exports and imports of overseas investing enterprises and their 
affiliates preferential treatment. NDRC and the China Export and Credit Insurance Com-
pany (SINOSURE) established a preferential insurance rate for key overseas investment 
projects and simplified underwriting formalities (Cai 2006, 630). 
5 China’s bilateral investment treaty practise  
In addition to the aforementioned OFDI promotion measures which the Chinese government 
has introduced on the domestic level, China has also been very active in signing BITs. It 
negotiated its first BIT with Sweden in 1982 and since then had signed 120 treaties by June 
2007, making China the second largest contracting party to BITs worldwide.19 BITs are the 
most important legal instrument that China uses in order to protect IFDI and OFDI simulta-
neously. The growing number of BITs and the policy of gradual development from a restric-
tive to a liberal approach reflect both China’s history as a capital-importing country and its 
recent growth rates in capital exports, mainly towards developing countries. The Chinese 
government is signing BITs with developed countries to promote IFDI and with developing 
countries in order to protect its growing OFDI. Figure 3 reveals a rapid increase in the num- 
ber of Chinese BITs and a growing acceptance of international investment agreements as 
legal instruments for the protection of foreign direct investment since China's opening to-
wards the world economy at the end of the 1970s. By June 2007, China had signed a total of 
28 BITs with developed and another 92 BITs with developing countries.20 Whereas China 
signed 11 BITs with developed countries in the second half of the 1980s and 8 with devel-
oping countries, this pattern has changed significantly since the early 1990s due to the grow-
ing importance of OFDI flows. Since then, China has signed far more BITs with developing 
than with developed countries. The growth in the number of Chinese BITs with developed 
countries since 2000 can be ascribed to the fact that these treaties are lately being renegoti-
ated to replace BITs concluded in the 1980s. BITs generally contain a provision stating their 
termination after a certain period of time, usually 5 to 10 years, in order to keep investors at 
the status quo of international investment lawmaking (UNCTAD 2007b, 20).21 Thus, devel-
                                                 
19 Germany has signed 136 BITs until June 2007. 
20 The differentiation of countries used in this paper has been adopted from the methodology used by UNCTAD 
in its current World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2007a). Accordingly, the term “developed countries” re-
fers to North American countries, member states of the European Union, West-European countries and other 
developed countries like Israel, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. All other countries are pooled together 
under the term “developing countries”. This simple classification is appropriate with regard to Sino-foreign 
BITs because developed countries are generally accountable for the majority of FDI flows worldwide and es-
pecially to China. 
21 Chinese BITs usually provide that the treaty shall remain in force unless either contracting party ex-
presses its will to terminate the agreement.  
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oped countries in recent years have increasingly demanded renegotiation of outdated treaties 
in order to adapt to new legal realities shaped by the conclusion of liberal Chinese BITs with 
developed countries. Figure 4 shows that the geographical distribution of Chinese BITs has 
changed significantly from the mid 1980s onwards. Between 1984 and 1989 roughly 40 per 
cent of the BITs signed were concluded with Asian and West European countries respec-
tively. The first half of the 1990s then saw a growing importance of Latin American coun-
tries as contracting parties of Chinese BITs and the end of the Cold War with its demise of 
the Eastern Block led to a flood of new agreements with Central and Eastern European 
countries. In the second half of the 1990s China did not sign a single BIT with a Western 
European country. Instead, Africa became the most important Chinese partner region. 
This trend has continued since 2000 and can generally be ascribed to the growing importance 
of Africa as a host region of Chinese resource extracting OFDI. China has signed no treaty 
with the US or Canada so far. The cautious Chinese attitude towards BITs including pre-
establishment protection clauses leading to a liberalization of the domestic regulatory system 
for IFDI is regarded as a main reason behind this refusal. Current negotiations with Canada 
had initially been expected to be concluded by the end of 2007.22 Although the US has ex-
pressed its wish to negotiate a BIT with China, there has been no progress on this issue so far. 
Apart from the growth of the number of Chinese BITs, a content analysis of these agree-
ments reveals a sharp policy change at the end of the 1990s towards a liberal approach,  
 
                                                 
22 Boscariol / Orlando (2006): Canada signs Bilateral Investment Treaty with Peru, India and China are 
next, available at: http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=6585. 
Figure 3: Growth of Chinese BITs (signed), 1984–June 2007 
  
Source: Own presentation based on UNCATD IIA database, available athttp://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp? 
 intItemID=2344&lang=1. 
Note: This figure shows the most recent BITs for the respective contracting partners. If there is a renegotiated BIT the 
 figure does not entail the older BIT. 
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with stronger investment protection expected to have a significant impact on the legal pro-
tection of FDI. Chinese BIT policy so far can be divided into three stages: During the first 
stage (1949–1981) China displayed a hostile approach towards foreign investors in accor-
dance with the broader movement of the developing countries’ attempt to establish a New 
International Economic Order. China's foreign policy then was shaped by the Five Princi-
ples of Peaceful Co-existence, incorporating “mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence” (Kong 2003: 109). Applied 
to the area of investment protection, the Five Principles led to a policy that accentuated the 
sovereign right to control the entry of FDI, regulate foreign investors and nationalize for-
eign property without the obligation to compensation. Consequently, China signed no BIT 
until the first one with Sweden in 1982 (Kong 2003: 109). With the gradual opening up of 
Figure 4: Geographical distribution of Chinese BITs (signed), 1984–June 2007 
 
Source: Own presentation based on UNCATD IIA database, available athttp://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page. 
 asp? intItemID=2344&lang=1 
1995-99
Western Europe Central and Eastern Europe
Latin America Africa
Oceania Asia
1984-89 1990-94
2000-05
China and the global governance of foreign direct investment 
German Development Institute   21
the Chinese economy after 1979, a second stage of Chinese BIT practice (1982-1998) set in, 
characterized by changing attitudes towards international investment policy-making and 
support for a cautious legal protection of FDI. The number of BITs grew substantially to a 
total of 80 by mid-1998. However, Chinese BIT practice until the late 1990s remained 
marked by a reluctance to imply strong investment protection. Table 5 on pages 24 and 25 
shows the development of Chinese BITs provisions from the 1980s onwards. Until 1998 
China signed BITs that contained serious reservations towards strong substantive as well as 
procedural protection of foreign investments, an investment policy approach generally rep-
resentative for capital-importing countries. The overall effectiveness of FDI protection 
through Chinese BITs is to be rated as low. With regard to relative standards of treatment of 
foreign investors, China was reluctant to grant national treatment. Some BITs with devel-
oped countries included provisions on national treatment, however containing far-reaching 
qualifications limiting the effective protection of foreign investments. Apart from these trea-
ties most BITs with developed and developing countries merely guaranteed most-favoured-
nation treatment. China only warily granted foreign investors the right to international arbi-
tration as a means to settle disputes over breaches of BIT-provisions. Earlier BITs at times 
had not even contained investor-state dispute resolution provisions. BITs including investor-
state dispute resolution provisions before China signed the convention of the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) on February 9 1990 limited them to 
disputes concerning the amount of compensation due in case of expropriation and nationali-
zation. Other restrictions of international arbitration concerned provisions for first exhaust-
ing the potential of local remedies, the consent of both parties for dispute submission to an 
international tribunal, and the application of the host country’s laws. These safeguards were 
meant to preserve sovereign rights in regulation of foreign investments (Chen 2006, 900). 
The third stage, which began in 1998, has been marked by a gradual yet decisive shift to-
wards stronger substantive and procedural protection of FDI. The first milestone to mark 
this stage was a BIT signed July 1998 between China and Barbados. Compared to BITs of 
the second stage, this agreement was the first to offer foreign investors unrestricted access 
to international arbitration under the rules of the ICSID or the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The only remaining restriction, namely the 
requirement to exhaust the new Administrative Review Procedure that is supposed to de-
termine the proper and legal conduct of administrative agencies under Chinese law, does 
not involve court proceedings and has therefore a very limited restrictive capacity (Schill 
2007, 17). The adoption of unrestricted access to international arbitration for foreign in-
vestors was notably first introduced in a number of new BITs with developing countries 
(Schill 2007, 18). It shows China behaving like a capital-exporting country, trying to in-
crease the legal protection of its own foreign investments. The Chinese BIT with Bot-
swana, signed in June 2000, includes a comprehensive investor-state dispute resolution 
mechanism and stronger provisions for compensation for losses due to war and civil strife. 
In addition to the regular most-favoured-nation clause this BIT grants foreign investors the 
same treatment as domestic investors in the case of war and civil strife. Apart from the 
treaty signed in 1988 with Australia, the first BIT to include up-to-date absolute standards 
of treatment of foreign investors was the Chinese BIT with Brunei signed in November 
2000. It covered the general principles of fair and equitable treatment, full protection and 
security, and non-discrimination, without qualifying these provisions as older agreements 
had done before. The first Chinese BIT to grant foreign investors national treatment was 
concluded with Japan in 1988. National treatment provisions in the Sino-Japanese BIT are 
qualified by the requirement to refrain from national treatment for reasons of public order, 
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national security and sound development of the national economy. These qualifications 
allows for the opportunity to uphold discriminations against the operation of foreign in-
vestors (Schill 2007, 20). The award of unrestricted national treatment was introduced on 
a permanent basis in a BIT with the Netherlands in 2001. The provisions of the Sino-
Dutch BIT were also adopted in Chinese BITs with Germany in 2003 and with Finland in 
2004. With the exception of the BIT with Bosnia Herzegovina, China does not adopt an 
unrestricted national treatment clause in its BITs with developing countries. They gener-
ally entail national treatment provisions containing the qualification that national treat-
ment is to be accorded to foreign investment without prejudice to domestic laws and regu-
lations and thus grant less protection for FDI. The Chinese state-of-the-art investment pro-
tection is found in the 2004 treaty with Finland. In addition to strong absolute and relative 
standards of treatment, extensive provision of compensation for losses due to war and civil 
strive as well as comprehensive investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms, it also en-
closes an explicit ban of local content and export performance requirements. 
The vertical (i.e. chronological) analysis of individual standard provisions of Chinese 
BITs in Table 3 reveals a gradual policy change towards stronger and more comprehen-
sive investment protection in Chinese BITs. Renegotiated BITs with developed countries 
entail all standard provisions that are common to modern BIT practice worldwide. This 
shows that China has agreed to international standards of the legal protection of FDI and 
thus to the current liberal global governance regime for FDI.23 This development in Chi-
nese international investment policy occurs simultaneously with the global trend towards 
stronger and more comprehensive investment protection promoted by capital-exporting 
developed countries. However, the fact that China has introduced numerous innovations in 
BITs with developing countries first hints at a pro-active policy shift (Schill 2007, 17–18). 
This argument is supported by the fact that China since the early 1990s has continued to 
sign far more BITs on a South-South than on a North-South basis. This trend in Chinese 
international investment law making is consistent with the findings of Section 3, which 
showed that China's OFDI/IFDI ratio is favours developing countries over developed 
countries. Although China’s overall OFDI/IFDI ratio is still low due to high FDI inflows 
originating in developed countries, the Chinese government has currently begun negotiat-
ing BITs with developing countries from the position of a capital-exporter and insists on 
stronger protection of its own investments. An explanation for this development may be 
found in the high importance attached to OFDI in the “Going Global” strategy (Chen 
2007, 782). It is no coincidence that the change in Chinese BIT policy overlapped in time 
with the announcement of this strategy. Discussions within the Chinese government reveal 
that growing OFDI flows have led to a strategic perception shift and to greater support for  
 
 
 
                                                 
23 This liberal BIT approach, however, has been discussed controversially among Chinese academics. 
Chen (2006 and 2007) calls for a break in the conclusion of liberal BITs with developed countries due 
to the fact that their provisions are not consistent with the principle of equality and mutual benefit as 
cited in the preamble of Chinese BITs. Instead, referring to Marxist and New International Economic 
Order reasoning, he argues that China should be aware of the fact that it is still in the position of a net 
capital-importing country in comparison to developed countries, and should refrain from accepting 
strong investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms. This, however, does mean that China should not 
conclude liberal BITs with developing countries in order to protect Chinese OFDI. 
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protection of Chinese investments abroad.24 The Chinese government’s evolving liberal 
BIT approach forms a contribution to the promotion and protection of OFDI by Chinese 
enterprises. 
                                                 
24 Anonymous interview with an expert of Chinese OFDI policy making. 
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6 Conclusion 
China has pro-actively undertaken a decisive policy shift towards the conclusion of liberal 
BITs with developing countries since the end of the 1990s. The (re-)negotiation of older 
BITs demanded by developed countries is regarded as a mere consequence of this change. 
China moved away from its traditionally cautious approach towards international invest-
ment policymaking that was characterized by several exceptions and safeguards against 
strong substantive and procedural investment protection. Today it concludes rules compa-
rable to those of global BIT practice set by developed countries.  
Although outflows of FDI have increased strongly relative to inflows during the last years, 
the change in Chinese BIT policy-making is counterintuitive given the fact that China is 
still a net capital-importing country and will remain so in the near future due to strong FDI 
inflows from developed countries. In order to explain a liberal international investment 
approach against the backdrop of an overall net capital-importing position, the present 
paper has analysed the patterns of the OFDI/IFDI ratio – i.e. the importance of outflows 
relative to inflows of FDI – on a regional basis. In this respect the paper finds that China’s 
OFDI/IFDI ratio towards developing countries is roughly six times higher than that to-
wards developed countries. This breakdown of investment patterns helps to explain the 
gradual development of China’s BIT policy towards a liberal approach that is representa-
tive for capital-exporting countries even before China has actually become a net capital-
exporting country.  
Examining a representative sample of Chinese BITs, this study revealed that the policy 
change was a pro-active decision of the Chinese government that coincided with its strate-
gic decision to promote outward investments through its “Going Gobal” strategy at the 
end of the 1990s. In addition to OFDI promotion measures at the domestic level China 
also introduced a liberal BIT policy approach that incorporates, among other things, com-
prehensive dispute resolution mechanisms, strong provisions for compensation for losses 
in the case of war and civil strife and far-reaching absolute and relative standards of treat-
ment of foreign investors. On balance, Chinese BITs with developed countries provide for 
slightly higher levels of investment protection than Chinese BITs with developing coun-
tries. The latter generally do not entail comprehensive national treatment clauses. 
With respect to Ikenberry’s initially cited question on the nature of China’s international 
policies, the present study finds that the Chinese government has adopted a complemen-
tary rather than a competitive approach in the field of global FDI governance. In the words 
of Ikenberry, China is not overthrowing the existing order of FDI governance but has 
rather become part of it. Of course, it is still too early to predict how Chinese companies 
will make use of this liberal regulatory framework through international arbitration which 
is essential for putting BIT provision in concrete terms. However, the alignment of Chi-
nese and Western BIT policies with regard to codified norms and rules of FDI protection 
will have profound consequences for developed and developing countries and, of course, 
for China itself.  
Although China has been a strong proponent of international investment policy-making 
with regard to the number of signed BITs, it still pursued a largely passive approach aimed 
at attracting FDI inflows from developed countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The 
adoption of liberal investment policies designed to protect Chinese foreign investments 
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has been a necessary precondition for the characterization of China as a significant global 
player of global FDI governance. Due to the reciprocal nature of BIT provisions this pol-
icy shift, first of all, will have consequences for China itself through the levelling of the 
playing field for international investors. It will lead to an increased exposure of domestic 
enterprises to the competition of MNEs. Foreign investors from countries that concluded 
BITs with China from 1998 onwards25 will be treated much like domestic investors and 
will thus be given the right to take legal action against breaches of the treaty before inde-
pendent international arbitration bodies. This new policy is bound to contribute to the 
opening up of the Chinese economy and its accession to the WTO and will integrate China 
further into the world economy.  
Secondly, due to the reciprocal nature of BITs, the playing field for regulatory FDI re-
gimes will be also levelled in developed and developing countries. This points to a new 
development in China’s international economic policy that traditionally embraces the no-
tion of respect for the principle of sovereignty. Demanding far-reaching protection for 
growing Chinese foreign investments and an unrestricted right to use international arbitra-
tion may limit the ability of respective partner countries to regulate foreign investments in 
accordance with national policy goals. Developing countries in particular are facing a re-
duction of their policy space, already limited by BITs with developed countries. The 
study’s qualitative content analysis thus, reveals that China’s BIT policy contradict the 
widespread rhetoric, often based only on the number of agreements, of a mutually benefi-
cial South-South cooperation amongst developing countries. In essence, China’s BIT ap-
proach is similar to the approach of OECD countries which has been criticized by devel-
oping countries and NGOs for overemphasizing foreign investors’ rights. 
Thirdly, the emerging congruence of China’s and developed countries’ investment policies 
at the bilateral level gives rise to the possibility of enhanced cooperation between both on 
the international level. Although conflicting perspectives on contents of multilateral in-
vestment rules continue to exist between large developing countries and developed coun-
tries (as well as amongst developed countries, too), innovative policy dialogues like the 
Heiligendamm Process between established G8 countries and emerging countries may be 
a first starting point for the development of common rules and norms aimed at preventing 
the likelihood of a turbulent multilateralism in the field of global FDI governance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Even foreign investors from countries that concluded older and hence more restrictive BITs with China 
can benefit from the more comprehensive national treatment clause in the newer BITs. All Chinese 
BITs include a most-favoured-nation provision aimed at treating all foreign investors equally. All inves-
tors will thus benefit from the comprehensive national treatment provision in the new Chinese BITs 
(Schill 2007, 25). 
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Appendix A: Definition and grading of criteria provisions (used in Table 3) 
Admission of investment: With regard to the admission of FDI, two basic models are 
currently in use worldwide. While the admission model makes the admission and estab-
lishment subject to the domestic laws of the host country, the other model grants foreign 
investors a right of establishment. Analysing the effectiveness of Chinese BITs, the first 
model's usefulness was rated only “medium” since it protects investments that are in ac-
cordance with the regulations of the host country. The usefulness of the second model was 
valued as “high” due to the fact that it goes beyond the first model, liberalizing the host 
country's IFDI regime and enhancing the market access of international investors.  
Absolute standard of treatment: Absolute standards are non-contingent and establish a 
standard of treatment of an investment without referring to the manner in which other in-
vestments are treated. Absolute standards of treatment require fair and equitable treat-
ment, full protection and security and non-discrimination of foreign investors. Chinese 
BITs granting only fair and equitable treatment were valued as “low”. BITs including ad-
ditional full protection and security or non-discrimination provisions were valued as “me-
dium”. BITs containing all three provisions but limiting their validity by qualifying them 
were also valued “medium”. Chinese BITs that refer to all three provisions without quali-
fications were valued as “high”.  
Relative standard of treatment: Relative standards define the treatment of investments 
referring to the treatment of other investments. National treatment and most-favoured-
nation treatments contain the most important relative standard provisions. National treat-
ment refers to provisions granting foreign investors treatment no less favourable than the 
treatment granted to investments of domestic investors. Most-favoured-nation treatment 
provisions assure investors of one contracting party that they shall not be treated less fa-
vourable by the other contracting party investors of third countries. Chinese BITs includ-
ing most-favoured-nation treatment were valued “low”. BITs containing additional na-
tional treatment provisions but qualifying them (e.g. national treatment subject to national 
law) were valued as “medium”. Chinese BITs including both relative standards were val-
ued as “high”. 
Expropriation and Compensation: Most Chinese BITs state four conditions justifying 
lawful expropriation, namely public purpose, due process of law, non-discrimination and 
payment of compensation. A great number of Chinese BITs state that compensation shall 
be equivalent to the value of an investment immediately before its expropriation or its 
threatened expropriation has become publicly known. Provisions in Chinese BITs treating 
expropriation and compensation are fairly uniform. A slight change that justifies a grading 
is found in the due process concept that is to be respected by a contracting party when 
undertaking an expropriation. BITs generally refer to the principle of legality, either by 
requiring that expropriation procedures comply with domestic legislation or by granting 
the foreign investor with the right of an independent review of an expropriation which is 
expected to be fairer. Chinese BITs were valued “medium” if they granted the first and 
“high” if they contained the latter requirement.  
Transfer of Funds: Transfer provisions are particularly important to foreign investors 
seeking to guarantee the proper operation of their investments. Regulation of capital flows 
is usually of interest for developing countries. BIT texts generally state that transfers are to 
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be made without delay in a freely convertible currency and at a specified rate of exchange. 
Furthermore, BITs typically require the transfer of funds to be conducted according to 
domestic laws and regulations. Some BITs grant the right to transfer fund out of the host 
country only; they were valued “low”. Other BITs explicitly or implicitly allow inbound 
and outbound transfers of funds; they were valued “medium”. A third group of BITs addi-
tionally require that transfers be conducted in accordance to most-favoured-national treat-
ment instead just in accordance with national laws and regulations of the host country; 
they were valued “high”.  
War and civil disturbance: BITs usually include provisions concerning the situation that 
foreign investments are damaged as a result of war or civil strife. Standard protection 
granted by BITs in case of damages caused by war of civil strife varies. Significantly few 
BITs do not address the issue at all; they were valued “low”. A second group of BITs 
grants most-favoured-nation treatment stating that the host country does not have to pay 
compensation to foreign investors, even if the country does provide compensation to its 
own nationals; they were valued “medium”. A third group of BITs also provides national 
treatment in addition to most-favoured-nation treatment; they were valued “high”. 
Settlement of investor-state disputes: Investor-state dispute settlement provisions are 
common features of recent BITs. They increase the level of certainty for foreign investors 
regarding the host country’s business environment. Allowing foreign investors to directly 
defend their rights without having to depend on diplomatic protection of their home coun-
tries. Most BITs allow for international investment arbitration, often using ICSID (and/or 
UNCITRAL) rules. Chinese BITs excluding investor-state dispute resolutions or the pos-
sibility of using international investment arbitration only for limited purposes like expro-
priation and nationalization were valued “low”. Chinese BITs accepting a broader cover-
age of international arbitration but including serious restrictions on the scope and proce-
dure of ICSID arbitration, e.g., the exhaustion of local remedies or the consent of both 
parties and/or application of the host country laws, were valued “medium”. Chinese BITs 
containing dispute settlement procedures which allow foreign investors to take any dispute 
directly to international arbitration following a mandatory six-month waiting period were 
valued “high”. In some cases, the BIT text requires that all resources of China’s new Ad-
ministrative Review Procedures be exhausted. Schill (2007) states that this administrative 
review mechanism has the aim of determining whether the conduct of the administrative 
agencies was legal and appropriate under Chinese law. It does not involve court proceed-
ings and is therefore a weaker regulation than the provision for exhausting local remedies. 
The corresponding dispute settlement procedures were, nevertheless, given a "high" value. 
Performance requirements: Performance requirements are conditions imposed by the 
host country on foreign investors; they are aimed at influencing the location and character 
of investments as well as the distribution of costs and benefits between the host country 
and foreign investors. Chinese BITs without any direct or indirect provision on perform-
ance requirements were valued “low”. BITs that include provisions concerning the appli-
cation of other rules (such as the WTO Agreement on TRIMs) were valued “medium”. 
Those Chinese BITs explicitly referring to the restriction of performance requirements 
were valued “high”. 
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Appendix B: Chinese bilateral investment treaties, 1982 – June 1 2007 
No. Partner country Date of Signature Availability 
1 France 30.05.1984 Not available in English 
2 Norway 21.11.1984 Available 
3 Singapore 21.11.1985 Available 
4 Thailand 12.03.1985 Available 
5 Kuwait 23.11.1985 Available 
6 Austria 12.09.1985 Available 
7 Denmark 29.04.1985 Available 
8 Italy 28.01.1985 Not available in English 
9 Sri Lanka 13.03.1986 Available 
10 Switzerland 12.11.1986 Not available in English 
11 United Kingdom 15.05.1986 Available 
12 Japan 27.08.1988 Available 
13 New Zealand 22.11.1988 Available 
14 Malaysia 21.11.1988 Not available 
15 Poland 07.06.1988 Available 
16 Australia 11.071988 Available 
17 Ghana 12.10.1989 Available 
18 Bulgaria 27.06.1989 Available 
19 Pakistan 12.02.1989 Available 
20 Russian Federation 21.07.1990 Not available 
21 Turkey 13.11.1990 Available 
22 Mongolia 25.08.1991 Available 
23 Papua New Guinea 12.04.1991 Not available 
24 Hungary 29.05.1991 Available 
25 Armenia 04.07.1992 Not available 
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26 Kazakhstan 10.08.1992 Not available 
27 Kyrgyzstan 14.05.1992 Not available 
28 Moldova, Republic 06.11.1992 Not available 
29 Turkmenistan 21.11.1992 Not available 
30 Ukraine 31.10.1992 Not available 
31 Uzbekistan 13.03.1992 Not available 
32 Korea, Republic of 30.09.1992 Not available 
33 Argentina 05.11.1992 Available 
34 Bolivia 08.05.1992 Available 
35 Philippines 20.07.1992 Available 
36 Vietnam 02.12.1992 Available 
37 Greece 25.06.1992 Available 
38 Albania 13.02.1993 Available 
39 Belarus 11.01.1993 Not available 
40 Croatia 07.06.1993 Available 
41 Georgia 03.06.1993 Available 
42 Tajikistan 09.03.1993 Not available 
43 Uruguay 02.12.1993 Available 
44 Lao People's Democratic Republic 31.01.1993 Available 
45 United Arab Emirates 01.07.1993 Not available 
46 Estonia 02.09.1993 Available 
47 Lithuania 08.11.1993 Available 
48 Slovenia 13.09.1993 Available 
49 Egypt 21.04.1994 Available 
50 Azerbaijan 08.03.1994 Not available 
51 Romania 12.07.1994 Available 
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No. Partner country Date of Signature Availability 
52 Chile 23.03.1994 Available 
53 Ecuador 21.03.1994 Not available in English 
54 Jamaica 26.10.1994 Available 
55 Peru 09.06.1994 Available 
56 Indonesia 18.11.1994 Available 
57 Iceland 31.03.1994 Available 
58 Morocco 27.03.1995 Not available in English 
59 Serbia and Montenegro 18.12.1995 Not available 
60 Cuba 24.04.1995 Available 
61 Israel 10.04.1995 Not available 
62 Oman 18.03.1995 Not available 
63 Algeria 17.10.1996 Not available 
64 Mauritius 04.05.1996 Not available 
65 Zambia 21.06.1996 Not available 
66 Zimbabwe 21.05.1996 Not available 
67 Bangladesh 12.09.1996 Not available 
68 Cambodia 19.07.1996 Available 
69 Lebanon 13.06.1996 Available 
70 Saudi Arabia 29.02.1996 Not available 
71 Syrian Arab Republic 09.12.1996 Not available 
72 Cameroon 10.05.1997 Not available in English 
73 Congo, Democratic Republic of 18.12.1997 Not available 
74 Gabon 09.05.1997 Not available 
75 South Africa 30.12.1997 Not available 
76 Sudan 30.05.1997 Not available 
77 Macedonia, 09.06.1997 Not available 
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78 Yemen 16.02.1998 Not available 
79 Cape Verde 21.04.1998 Not available 
80 Ethiopia 11.05.1998 Available 
81 Barbados 20.07.1998 Available 
82 Belize  16.01.1999 Not available 
83 Bahrain 17.06.1999 Available 
84 Qatar 09.04.1999 Available 
85 Botswana 12.06.2000 Available 
86 Congo 20.03.2000 Not available 
87 Brunei Darussalam 17.11.2000 Available 
88 Iran, Islamic Republic of 22.07.2000 Available 
89 Kenya 16.07.2001 Not available 
90 Mozambique 10.07.2001 Not available 
91 Nigeria 27.08.2001 Not available 
92 Sierra Leone  16.05.2001 Not available 
93 Myanmar 12.12.2001 Not available 
94 Jordan 15.11.2001 Available 
95 Cyprus 17.01.2001 Not available 
96 Netherlands 26.11.2001 Available  
97 Côte d'Ivoire 23.09.2002 Available 
98 Bosnia and Herzigovina 26.06.2002 Available  
99 Trinidad and Tobago 22.07.2002 Available 
100 Djibouti 18.08.2003 Available 
101 Guyana 27.03.2003 Available  
102 Germany 01.12.2003 Available 
103 Benin 18.02.2004 Not available 
104 Tunisia 21.06.2004 Not available 
105 Uganda 27.05.2004 Not available 
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No. Partner country Date of Signature Availability 
106 Finland 15.11.2004 Available 
107 Latvia 15.04.2004 Not available 
108 Sweden 27.09.2004 Not available 
109 Equatorial Guinea 20.10.2005 Not available 
110 Guinea 18.11.2005 Not available 
111 Madagascar 21.11.2005 Not available in English 
112 Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 22.03.2005 Not available 
113 Belgium and Luxembourg 06.06.2005 Not available 
114 Czech Republic 08.12 2005 Not available 
115 Portugal 09.12.2005 Not available in English 
116 Slovakia 07.12.2005 Not available 
117 Spain 14.11.2005 Not available in English 
118 Namibia 17.11.2005 Not available 
119 Vanuatu 07.04.2006 Not available 
120 India 21.11.2006 Not available 
Source: UNCTAD Investment Instruments Online database 
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